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Abstract 
 This paper studies the dynamics by which populations with heterogeneous 
preferences for local public good provision sort themselves into communities. I conduct 
laboratory experiments to consider which institutions may best facilitate efficient self-
organization when residents are able to move freely between locations. I find that 
institutions requiring all residents of a community to pay equal taxes enable subjects to 
sort into stable, homogeneous communities. However, populations can find themselves 
stuck at local, inefficient equilibria. Though sorted, residents may fail to attain the level 
of public good provision best suited for them and the system dynamics are crucial for 
determining whether subjects reach optimally-designed communities. When residents are 
able to vote for local tax policies with their ballots as well as with their feet, the 
inefficient local equilibria are eliminated, and each community converges to the most 
efficient outcome for its population.  
 
 
The ability of individuals to move between communities, groups, and organizations is 
fundamental. Mobility allows us to choose our friends and neighbors, to enter the locations that 
best satisfy our preferences, and to select the policies to which we must adhere. Self-organization 
can promote efficiency by enabling agents to sort themselves by their preferences for local 
outcomes, and thus to overcome preference revelation and collective action problems that cannot 
be internally solved by a single community.  
The aim of this paper is to test experimentally the relative success of various institutions 
in promoting efficient local public good provision in societies with highly divergent preferences, 
when residents are able to move between locations.  
In 1956, Charles Tiebout suggested that mobility can lead to efficient public good 
provision. He introduced the idea of local public goods, which were excludable geographically, 
and proposed a market-based solution to the problem of efficient public expenditures at the local 
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level. Tiebout’s proposal was not presented, and likely not intended, as a descriptive model of 
residential choice and public finance, but as an innovative “conceptual solution” to the problem 
of demand revelation.1 His paper was written in direct response to Musgrave (1939) and 
Samuelson (1954), who independently concluded that efficient provision of public goods through 
a decentralized pricing mechanism was impossible: since residents who did not contribute to the 
financing of the public good could not be excluded from consuming it, they had incentive to 
strategically underreport their true demand and to free-ride off of their neighbors. 
Local public goods allowed for spatial exclusion – since they were available only to those 
living within a jurisdiction, anyone wishing to consume the local public good would have to 
move into the community and pay the associated local taxes. If residents were able to move 
freely between jurisdictions then, rather than having to truthfully report their preferences within a 
community, Tiebout proposed that they would instead “vote with their feet,” and relocate to the 
community that perfectly matched their needs. In doing so, households would reveal their true 
preferences and could thus be taxed according to their demand. 
Since the inability to measure a household’s true demand for public goods is the central 
motivation for Tiebout’s proposal, it is perhaps unsurprising that attempts to directly test whether 
migration patterns are driven by preferences have proven difficult and that the evidence has often 
been varied and inconclusive. But public goods preferences can be readily generated in 
laboratory experiments by adjusting the payoffs that subjects receive from the outcome of a 
public goods game, and the dynamics of mobility and community formation may then be 
observed in a controlled environment. In addition, experiments can test the effectiveness of 
various institutions that would otherwise be very costly to assess in the field. In this paper, I 
conduct experiments to test elements of Tiebout’s proposition. These experiments are not 
intended as a precise depiction of local public finance and residential choice in all its complexity, 
but, rather, as an attempt to gain insight into the fundamental mechanism and processes that 
Tiebout envisioned by studying movement decisions within a simple environment.  
I consider whether mobility is, in itself, sufficient for achieving optimal public good 
provision, analyze the dynamics that may prevent optimality from being reached, and, given 
these dynamics, assess which institutions may be most successful in facilitating efficient self-
organization. I find that the system dynamics are crucial for determining whether a population 
arrives at an efficient allocation and that an institution’s success depends on its susceptibility to 
coordination failure.  
This paper considers a simple environment with three natural properties. First, the 
population has heterogeneous preferences for the public good: there are those who greatly 
benefit from the public good provided within their community, and those who benefit very little. 
Second, efficient public good provision is hindered by institutional design limitations. A 
community cannot force its residents to reveal their preference type against their own self-
interest, and thus may have difficulty charging different prices to different types within a single 
community. Finally, there are multiple locations and agents have full mobility between them. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Tiebout (1956), p. 424. Oates (2006) provides a discussion of whether Tiebout intended his paper as a descriptive 
theory or purely as a clever thought experiment. 
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A voluntary provision mechanism, which allows residents to contribute different amounts 
within the same community and is therefore susceptible to free-riding, is compared with three 
provision mechanisms requiring all residents to make the same local contributions. These latter 
three institutions generate a unique strong Nash equilibrium in which agents separate and 
consolidate by preference type, and consume at their optimum. This local contribution rate is 
variously determined a) by a fixed, posted per-capita tax, b) by a fixed, posted provision 
quantity, or c) by majority rule, with the institution varying between experimental sessions. The 
first two reflect Tiebout’s assumption that there exist a large number of available communities, 
representing a complete range of expenditure packages that are “more or less set” (Tiebout, 
1956, p. 418). In these sessions, each location is associated with a known policy for the duration 
of the experiment and among the available locations are those offering the optimal policies for 
each preference type. The voting institution incorporates a simple form of local governance that 
is responsive to the preferences of the current population. 
I find that voluntary contribution communities are highly unstable. The subjects 
continually move between locations throughout the experimental session and these locations 
experience fluctuations in the local provision levels. Those subjects who benefit most from 
public good provision often exit larger communities with declining provision in favor of smaller, 
less profitable ones, and frequent movement is associated with lower payoffs. Although subjects 
converge toward the Nash equilibrium contribution levels, this chronic movement leads to 
efficiency significantly below that predicted under the Nash equilibrium for a single, fixed 
community.  
Under all three of the institutions requiring all members of a community to make equal 
contributions, subjects separate by type into an optimal partition. When they are able to vote only 
with their feet, by moving between communities offering fixed taxes or provision levels, subjects 
often become stuck at local, inefficient equilibria such that they under- or over-provide the 
public good. Though they sort into separate, homogenous communities, the subjects often fail to 
attain the optimal provision within these communities, because they are unable to coordinate on 
the location offering the optimal tax-provision bundle for their type. This suggests that the 
existence of optimally-designed communities does not guarantee that they will be entered and 
that inertia, or the desire to be around others, can prevent optimality from being reached.  
Under the voting institution, which enables subjects to vote with both their feet and with 
ballots, these communities converge to the optimal outcome for their populations. Voting with 
their feet enables subjects to sort by moving to the community that they like, while voting with 
their ballots enables them to then move the community to their liking once they have arrived. 
This suggests that an internal mechanism that allows residents to influence community policy 
without needing to relocate may be necessary for overcoming coordination failure and achieving 
optimal allocations. Though Tiebout did not address the question of local governance, these 
experiments suggest that both local politics and system dynamics may be essential for 
determining whether local public goods are provided efficiently. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 reviews theoretical extensions and empirical 
tests of Tiebout’s hypothesis as well as previous experimental results on endogenous group 
formation; Section 2 sketches the simple Tiebout-style environment used in the experiments; 
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Section 3 describes the experimental design; Section 4 presents the experimental results; and 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
I.	  Local	  Public	  Goods,	  Community	  Sorting,	  and	  the	  Tiebout	  Hypothesis	  
The theoretical literature has since filled in and extended Tiebout’s sparse framework, 
formalizing his insights while incorporating housing prices, land provision, spillovers and 
crowding, as well as considering income heterogeneity and redistribution, and analyzing the 
determination of public good supply and its political requirements. This literature suggests that 
sorting may be difficult to achieve and whether an efficient allocation is reached often depends 
on the specifics of the environment. 
One approach has been to complete Tiebout’s analogy of local public goods as private 
goods, by integrating the model into general equilibrium theory. This work has largely found that 
Tiebout’s proposition holds only under highly restrictive conditions.2 The general equilibrium 
interpretation is reflected in the experimental sessions in this paper that have fixed local taxes or 
provision levels and offer agents a wide-range of budget-balanced expenditure packages. 
An alternative approach departs from Tiebout’s assumptions by incorporating models of 
local governance and considers the simultaneity of selecting a community and voicing political 
preferences while there. These models have primarily focused on majority rule, and are captured 
by the voting institution considered in this paper.3 This literature strives to capture the highly 
complex process of residential choice, but often the resulting conclusions and equilibrium 
characterizations are dependent upon the particular features of the models.4 The goal of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 When the number of jurisdictions is fixed, often there does not exist an equilibrium that satisfies the First Welfare 
Theorem (for instance, Ellickson, 1979; Bewley, 1981). When allowing for the entry of entrepreneurial 
communities, approximate equilibria (ε-equilibria) may converge to Pareto optimality in large economies (see 
Wooders, 1999 for an overview). 
3 An exception is Kollman, Miller, and Page (1997), which considers a computational Tiebout model under 
democratic referenda, direct competition, and proportional representation institutions. They find that the institution 
that produces the worst outcomes in a fixed, single jurisdiction society is actually the most successful when agents 
can move between jurisdictions (and vice-versa), as the institutions that cause residents of heterogeneous 
communities to be least satisfied encourage exit and therefore promote sorting.  
4 Westhoff (1977) considers a majority voting rule by which residents select the level of public service expenditure 
within their community through the form of a tax rate, and establishes the existence of an equilibrium with 
separation by types. Rose-Ackerman (1979) adds divisible land markets and shows that equilibrium may not exist. 
Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984/1993) introduce housing prices and characterize their equilibrium result with the 
property that communities populated by residents with the highest incomes also have the highest levels of public 
services and the highest housing prices. Other models determine public good provision through a wealth tax, either 
at the national or local level (Dunz, 1989; Nechyba, 1997). Konishi (1996) includes spillovers from other residents, 
as well as snob effects and demonstrates equilibrium existence with majority voting. Epple and Platt (1998) allow 
for preference heterogeneity, in addition to income variation, within this framework and find an equilibrium in 
which communities are heterogeneous along both income and preference dimensions while still satisfying the 
ascending bundles property. Pogodzinski and Sjoquist (1991) allow for differences in preferences, though not 
income, and find that the social choice rules within the jurisdictions determine the effect of production costs on 
capitalization. Others have shown that sorting can occur not only by the local policies, but also by community-wide 
values (Benabou, 1996a/b and Epple and Romano, 1998 address neighborhood and peer effects). Preferences over 
jurisdictional locale have also been incorporated, for instance by Cassidy, Epple, and Romer (1989), who assume 
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paper is to strip away this complexity, return to the simplified setting that Tiebout addressed, and 
to study the underlying dynamics of the residential sorting process in the absence of specific 
environmental factors. 
There is also a vast empirical literature aimed at testing the implications of the Tiebout 
model within communities in the United States. Many studies have shown local sorting along 
demographic factors such as income, race, and education, as well as by political and cultural 
preferences.5 However, the extent to which residents move in response to their preferences for 
public goods, sort into communities where other residents share their preferences, and consume 
their optimal package of local services, is far less clear (Dowding, John, and Biggs, 1994). 
Consistent with Tiebout’s assumptions, American cities vary greatly in public services 
provided and demanded.6 While survey data have suggested that a household’s decision to move 
is rarely based on public expenditure considerations,7 there is also considerable evidence that 
public services (especially education quality) and tax rates are significant factors in 
neighborhood choice once a household has already decided to move.8 However, the few direct 
tests of migration based on local policies and environmental impacts have produced conflicting 
conclusions.9 
The difficulty in measuring public goods preferences and how they drive movement 
decisions suggest that laboratory experiments can play a significant role in understanding the 
mechanisms of residential choice and community sorting. The experiments in this paper, which 
allow agents with different preferences to sort by local tax and provision policies, are the first of 
their kind, but build on recent experiments on voluntary public good provision in endogenously-
formed groups. Voluntary contributions experiments in fixed, exogenously-assigned groups have 
consistently found that initial contributions are midway between optimal and Nash equilibrium 
levels, but that these contributions quickly decline and approach the theoretical equilibrium 
(Ledyard, 1995). Experiments that allow subjects to select their group in each period have shown 
that free-mobility is not sufficient to sustain contributions and, if movement is unrestricted, free-
riders will chase cooperators from location to location (Ehrhart and Keser, 1999).  
When subjects differ in the returns that they receive from the public good, there is a clear 
dynamic in which those who benefit the most from local provision found and develop groups. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that some locations are superior to others and deBartolome and Ross (2003), who assume that location preference 
varies by income. 
5 See for instance: Costa and Kahn (2000) and Bishop (2008). 
6 Stein (1987) finds high variation in the bundles of services provided across communities. Gramlich and Rubinfeld 
(1982) find that variation in demand for public services is much lower within communities than throughout a wider 
population. Rhode and Strumpf (2003) found between-community disparities in local policies are on the decline.  
7 Rhode and Strumpf (2003). 
8 See for instance: Reschovsky (1979), Percy, Hawkins, and Maier (1995), and Fox, Herzog, and Schlottman (1989).	  
9	  For instance, a set of studies examining population changes in response to environmental impacts have found only 
marginal or no evidence of an effect on migration patterns (Been and Gupta, 1997; Cameron and McConnaha, 2006; 
Greenstone and Gallagher, 2008) while Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) find that increases in toxic air pollutants are 
associated with population decreases as well as exit of higher income households and/or entry of lower income 
households.  
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They are then followed by others even when entry fees are relatively large, provision declines, 
and the cycle restarts (Robbett, 2010). This chasing phenomenon persists even when the public 
good is purely non-rivalrous, such that there is never monetary incentive to found a new group. 
This suggests that people are often unwilling to remain where others are contributing less than 
they are, and so group stability may be contingent upon requiring equal contributions from all 
members. 
Implementation of formal boundary rules or other mechanisms that current members may 
use to control group composition have been highly successful in increasing and sustaining 
contributions, though subjects are sometimes prone to over-exclusion (Ahn, Isaac, and Salmon, 
2008/2009; Charness and Yang, 2010; Weber, 2006; Page, Putterman, and Unel, 2005). Finally, 
experiments have also shown that subjects will vote with their feet for institutions allowing them 
to punish free-riders (Gürerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach, 2006). 
 
II.	  Environment	  
	  
I construct a basic Tiebout-style environment, in which residents may move between 
communities providing different quantities of the public good. In each time period, all agents 
simultaneously select their location, where they receive a payoff that is increasing over public 
good provision in the community and decreasing over the amount that they personally contribute 
toward provision.  
There is a finite set of agents, N = {1, … , n}, and of locations, L = {1, ... , k}.  
A state (l, x) is an n-tuple of locations l = (l1, … ln), where l i is an integer between 1 and 
k, and an n-tuple of contributions x = (x1, …, xn).  
The feasible values of x follow one of two cases. In the first case, contributions are 
voluntary and, for all i, xi may be any number greater than or equal to 0. In the second case, 
contributions are uniform for all members of a location, such that for any two agents i and j,        
l i= l j implies that xi =xj. In this case, there is a mapping t: L ⇒ ℝ+ such that xi = t(li). 
 
There exists a public good that is:  
a) Purely non-rivalrous: the public good is not depleted by the presence of additional 
community members; 
b) Produced at constant returns to scale: the public good provided is equal to the total 
contributions; 
c) Local: an agent’s contributions finance the public good only within his location and an 
agent receives a return from a location’s public good if and only if he resides in that 
location (there are no spillovers).  
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Let Xj be the quantity of public good provided in location j. Then, 
 
€ 
X j = x i
i s.t. l i = j
∑ 	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (1)	  
The non-rivalry of the public good is a departure from Tiebout’s assumptions. He 
suggested production technology as the motivation for providing public goods at the local level 
and assumed that communities face a per-capita cost curve that is u-shaped over the number of 
residents, implying an optimal community size that is less than the total population.  
These experiments consider a non-rivalrous public goods environment in order to study 
movement solely in response to preference differences, without the complication of crowding 
concerns that are particular to production technologies. In addition, if the population has highly 
divergent preferences and everyone within a location must pay a uniform local tax, then a pure 
public good in this environment need not imply that a population would prefer to cluster in a 
single location. The experimental design in this paper has the property that preference types 
would prefer to separate when community members face a uniform tax policy. Finally, the pure 
public good environment gives subjects the best possible shot at being comparatively successful 
in the voluntary contributions case, when free-riding is the only obstacle to a society achieving 
the most efficient possible outcome by pooling its resources into a single community. 
In each period, each agent i receives a payoff from residing in location l i:  
€ 
π i(l,x) = Ai ln(X l i ) − x i 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (2)	  
Agents differ only in the parameter Ai, which determines their marginal rate of 
substitution between the public good and private consumption.10 It is easily shown that the best 
response of agent i is to contribute the exact amount necessary to bring the collective community 
contributions to Ai: 
€ 
x*i =max(0,Ai − x j
s.t .l j = l i , j≠ i
∑ )
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (3)
	  
 
Thus when agents are able to voluntarily contribute any amount to the public good, in 
equilibrium each community’s total provision will equal the maximum value of A represented in 
the community. However, the efficient provision for the community (which maximizes the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This is a modification of the Cobb-Douglas preference function that has several useful properties – in particular, 
that agents are strictly better off as the level of public good in their community increases, that each type of agent has 
a preferred tax policy, and that an agent’s best-response is to contribute less than his preferred tax when 
contributions are voluntary. 
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aggregate payoffs of its residents) is equal to the sum of the parameters A in the community. 
Therefore, when contributions are voluntary, the public good is underprovided in equilibrium.   
Under an institution with uniform tax policies, all residents of community j pay an equal 
tax, t(j). In addition, let n(j) denote the number of residents of community j. Then the payoff 
function in equation (2) becomes:  
€ 
π i(l,x) = Ai ln(t(li) * n(li))− t(li)	   	   	   	   	   	   (4)	  
For any given number of residents, each agent has single peaked preferences over the tax 
in their community, such that i’s utility is maximized at tax t = Ai. Thus for each resident there is 
a trade off between being in a large community and being in a community where the tax is close 
to their ideal policy. When the values of A in the society diverge sufficiently, as in the 
experiments described in the following section, there does not exist any intermediate tax rate that 
would make all agents better off pooling their resources than they would be sorting by type and 
consuming at their optimal taxes in smaller communities.  
In these experiments, there are four agents for whom A = 5 (“Low Types”) and four 
agents for whom A = 85 (“High Types”). Figure 1 shows the payoff functions of each type over 
tax rate, for communities of four agents (separate) and communities of eight agents (pooled). The 
range of taxes for which the High Types receive higher payoffs by pooling their resources in an 
eight-person community than by segregating in a four-person community with their optimal tax 
policy of 85 is: t ∈ (19.72, 227.7). On the other hand, the Low Types would receive higher 
payoffs from pooling only if the larger community offered a tax in the range t ∈  (1.16, 13.4). As 
these ranges do not overlap, there is no tax rate for which both types would receive higher 
payoffs by being in a single community than they would by separating. 
   
        Figure 1: Payoff functions for the two types in communities of 8 (pooled) or 4 (separate) agents. 
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III.	  Experimental	  Design	  
	  
All experimental sessions were conducted at the Harvard Decision Science Laboratory in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. Participation was restricted to graduate and undergraduate students. 
Though most participants were Harvard University students, other local universities such as 
Boston University, Tufts, and Northeastern were also represented. Subjects participated in 
groups of sixteen people at a time, and interacted with seven anonymous others in the room 
using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).  
Subjects played a 20-period repeated game. In each period, they first chose a location and 
then made a contribution to the local public good. There were six available locations, which 
remained the same for the duration of the experiment, and were labeled “Group 1” through 
“Group 6.” The method of determining the contribution the subjects made depended on the 
institution governing their session. The four institutions were Voluntary Contributions, Fixed 
Tax, Fixed Quantity, and Voting.  
In Voluntary Contributions (VCM) sessions, each subject could contribute however much 
they wished. The latter three institutions required all members of a community to make identical 
contributions. Under the Fixed Tax institution, each of the locations was associated with a fixed, 
posted tax (t). Anyone who entered the location was required to contribute this amount in each 
period, for the duration of their time in that location. The provision quantity then depended on 
the number of residents who entered (i.e. t times the number of residents). Under the Fixed 
Quantity institution, each location was associated with a fixed, posted provision quantity (X) that 
was provided in this location in every period in which it was populated. The per-capita taxes 
were then dependent upon the number of residents who entered (i.e. X divided by the number of 
residents). Among the locations offered in the Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity conditions were 
those offering the optimal bundles for each of the preference types in the experiment. These 
institutions are most similar to Tiebout’s description of communities as offering public goods 
packages that remained fairly constant over time. Finally, under the Voting institution, the 
location’s current members voted on the local tax policy in each period. The median voter’s 
preference was implemented and all members were then required to contribute this amount in the 
period.  
A total of seventeen sessions were run: five sessions under the Voting institution and four 
under each of the other three institutions. Each session was populated by eight subjects. Four 
subjects in each session were randomly assigned to be “High Types,” who greatly benefited from 
public good provision in their community, and four were “Low Types,” who benefited very little. 
Subjects did not receive specific information on the payoffs of the other participants, but were 
aware that there was variation in the population. 
At the start of each period, subjects simultaneously selected the location they wished to 
enter. They then submitted a contribution and received their payoff for the period. This payoff 
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was given by equation (2), in which A = 85 for High Types and A = 5 for Low Types.11 Finally, 
they observed the outcomes of all locations over the previous three periods before making their 
next move. This included the number of residents and the subject’s personal payoff from the 
location (in all conditions), along with any fixed policies associated with the locations (in the 
Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity conditions), the previously enacted policies (in the Voting 
condition), or the total and personal contributions (in the Voluntary Contributions condition). 
Figure 2 shows the procedure of the stage game under each of these four conditions. 
In the first period, all subjects, in all conditions, began in the same initial location. The 
policy of this location under the Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity institutions was selected to be the 
same as the policy enacted in the Voting condition if all subjects voted for their ideal policy. 
Moving – selecting a different location than in the previous period – carried a cost of five 
experimental units.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  
Figure 2: Experimental Procedure under VCM, Fixed Tax, Fixed Quantity, and Voting. 
A partition of agents is Nash stable if there does not exist any agent who would receive a 
higher payoff by unilaterally moving to a different location. A partition of agents is strong Nash 
stable if there does not exist any set of agents, all of whom would receive a weakly higher payoff 
and at least one of whom would receive a strictly higher payoff, by coalitionally moving to 
different locations.  
Since the public good is pure, the state in which the entire population resides in a single 
location is strong Nash stable under Voluntary Contributions. However, under the Nash 
equilibrium contributions, this community underprovides the public good: the Low Types do not 
contribute anything and the High Types contribute 85 among the four of them. Thus the total 
provision level is equal to 85: less than one quarter of the optimal level for the population.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Subjects were not presented with this equation directly. They were instead given payoff tables, showing the 
payoff they would receive for various combinations of total contributions made in their community and personal	  
contributions. The experiment began only after all participants correctly answered a series of comprehension 
questions regarding the procedure and their payoffs.	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The payoffs for the two types are sufficiently different that there exists a unique strong 
Nash equilibrium under Fixed Tax, Fixed Quantity, and Voting in which the two types separate 
into two homogenous communities where they consume the optimal tax-provision pair for their 
type. In this state, the Low Types are together in a location with (t, X) = (5,20) and the High 
Types are together in a location with (t, X) = (85, 340).  
However, under both Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity, two forms of suboptimal Nash 
stable states exist. In the first, the types separate and consolidate but are in locations where the 
tax policy differs from the optimal for that population. Though High Types would prefer to be in 
a community with t = 85, any state in which all four are together paying t ∈ (8.7, 315) is Nash 
stable. Similarly, any state in which all four Low types are together paying t ∈ (0.5, 18.5) is 
Nash stable. The second form of suboptimal Nash stable states occur when the types are pooled 
in a single community with an intermediate tax policy. Any state in which all members are 
together in a community with tax t ∈ (4, 23) is Nash stable, as no subject would wish to 
independently exit a community of seven others in favor of striking out on his own. Both of these 
are eliminated as equilibria under the Voting institution. 
 
IV.	  Results	  and	  Discussion	  
Efficiency	  Convergence	  
I first compare efficiency convergence under the four institutions, relative to the baseline 
of the Nash equilibrium prediction under Voluntary Contributions, in which all subjects locate 
together but the public good is severely underprovided. The voluntary contribution Nash 
equilibrium is taken as the baseline since it is both the outcome that Tiebout was attempting to 
improve upon and the outcome to which standard public goods games tend to converge. The 
average efficiency over the final five periods of the twenty-period experiment under each 
institution is given in Figure 3.12 The most efficient outcome is represented by the dashed line, 
but is achievable only when residents can solve the demand revelation problem within a single 
community. The strong Nash state is the highest feasible outcome when residents sort into 
multiple communities and is represented by the dotted line.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Efficiency is smoothed over the final five periods so as to avoid over or under-emphasizing incidental deviations.	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Figure 3: Average Efficiency Under Each Institution  
	  
First, we see that the subjects achieve very low payoffs when contributions are voluntary, 
even relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction, suggesting that they are squandering their 
resources. Subjects may do worse than the Nash equilibrium outcome if they either locate in a 
single location but contribute less than the Nash equilibrium provision, or locate in multiple 
locations and diffuse their resources (or both). Efficiency under both Fixed Tax and Fixed 
Quantity is significantly greater than the baseline, at 33% and 35% respectively – or 
approximately 50% of the strong Nash outcome. Finally, efficiency under Voting is significantly 
higher, and nearly reaches the strong Nash outcome. Thus, while the Fixed Tax and Fixed 
Quantity institutions lead to moderate improvements in efficiency relative to our baseline, they 
still fall short of facilitating efficient public good provision, and only under Voting do the 
subjects approach the optimal allocation.13 
Sources	  of	  Inefficiency	  	  
There are two distinct causes of inefficiency in this environment: subjects may fail to 
properly sort by type or, upon sorting, may fail to provide the optimal level of public good for 
their community.  
A. Sorting	  
I first look at whether subjects reach a sorted partition. Figure 4 shows the proportion of 
time, over the final five periods of the experiment, that the types are sorted into two separated, 
consolidated groups. A subject is sorted if he is in a location with at least two of the three others 
of his type, and with no more than one member of the other type.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  The effect of institution on efficiency is significant, VCM efficiency is significantly below zero, and Voting 
efficiency is significantly higher than Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity efficiency, all at the .01 level.	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For all three institutions under which community members must contribute equal 
amounts, subjects are highly successful in sorting into two homogeneous groups. Over the final 
five periods, subjects in these three conditions are sorted 94% of the time. While there is little 
difference in community composition by the end of the twenty-period sessions under Fixed Tax, 
Fixed Quantity, and Voting, the institutions do vary in how rapidly subjects sort. Subjects require 
an average of 2.5 periods to first reach a sorted partition under Fixed Tax, 3.6 periods under 
Fixed Quantity, 5.95 periods under Voting and 10.2 periods under VCM. 
            
Figure 4: Sorting by Type in the Final Five Periods 
	  
B. Local	  Provision	  
Although subjects are eventually well-sorted under all three tax institutions, the question 
remains as to whether they provide the optimal level of public goods for their type within these 
homogenous communities. Unsurprisingly, contributions greatly differ from the optimal amounts 
when provision is voluntary. However, High Types under Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity, as well 
as Low Types under Fixed Quantity, often deviate from their optimal contribution as well. Over 
the final five periods, High Types’ contributions deviate from their optimum by approximately 
30% under both of these institutions, while Low Types contributions differ from their optimum 
by 150% under Fixed Quantity. Finally, when subjects are able to vote for their local tax rate, 
contributions differ from optimal levels by 0.8% overall.  
Dynamics	  	  
I next consider the dynamics under each of the four institutions that lead to these final outcomes.  
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A. Voluntary	  Contributions	  
The top left panel of Figure 5 shows the average contribution over time for each of the two types. 
This graph suggests that subjects are free-riding but that they are converging toward the 
equilibrium contribution level, and that the severe inefficiency we see in Figure 2 is not driven 
by under-contributing relative to the Nash equilibrium level. 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	   
Figure 5: Average Contributions Over Time Under VCM, Fixed Tax, Fixed Quantity, and Voting 
Though a community with all members of the population in a single location is both 
efficient and strong Nash stable, subjects do exit the all-inclusive community and they continue 
to move over the course of the session. All subjects are together in a single location for only half 
of all periods. While movement significantly declines over time under all three institutions with 
local mandatory tax rates, there is no such stabilization under Voluntary Contributions and, 
toward the end of the session, movement occurs with more than twice the frequency of the other 
institutions. 
Though it is the High Types who benefit most from being in communities providing the 
public good, they are the ones who typically initiate this movement by exiting large communities 
in favor of previously empty locations. These dynamics are very similar to those previously 
found in a linear pure public goods environment when subjects with different returns from the 
public good could move between locations (Robbett, 2010). There is a difference, however, in 
the efficiency relative to the Nash equilibrium. When payoffs are linear, no one contributes in 
  
 	  
	   15	  
equilibrium. But in an environment where public goods are provided in equilibrium, agents 
benefit from being in larger communities, and frequent movement may be harmful. Thus, in this 
environment, the ability to move leads to a worse outcome for the subjects than if they played the 
Nash equilibrium within a fixed group and mobility is actually detrimental to efficiency. 
Finally, we see that frequent movement is associated with lower payoffs. Table 1a 
presents fixed effects regressions of period-earnings on the subject’s movement decision and 
contribution decision. Movement is associated with a large, immediate loss, though this is not 
significant when controlling for the size of their (new) community. Table 1b presents OLS 
regression results of subjects’ total payoffs on frequency of movement, average contribution and 
type. Those subjects who move frequently earn significantly less during the course of the 
experiment. 
 
 
Table 1. The Immediate Effect and Aggregate Effect of Movement on Earnings 
B. Fixed	  Tax	  and	  Fixed	  Quantity	  
The Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity institutions are most similar to the environment 
envisioned by Tiebout: there exist many communities offering a wide range of exogenously-
determined local policies, which remain constant over time. The residents, in turn, select the 
community whose tax-provision pair best suits them, but do not influence the local policies in 
their chosen community.  
While High Types are more likely to exit larger groups in favor of smaller ones under 
Voluntary Contributions, this dynamic is reversed when communities have mandatory local 
taxes. Rather than being attracted to areas populated by High Types, the Low Types now flee the 
taxes, while the High Types tend to be more attracted to populated areas (in particular: they are 
attracted to other taxpayers). The Low Types exit the all-inclusive group in their first opportunity 
93.75% of the time under the Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity institutions, while less than half of 
the High Types do so. Figure 6a shows the average size of the community a subject exits, 
relative to the size of the community he enters, under both Voluntary Contributions and the 
Exogenous Tax conditions (Fixed Tax and Fixed Quantity). Figure 6b shows how the likelihood 
that a High Type exits his community declines over the number of other High Types in the 
community, both when this community provides the optimal policy and when it does not. 
 Earnings (Fixed Effects)        (1)                     (2) 
 Coefficient Coefficient 
Move -19.97* 
(p<.001) 
-8.14 
(p=.186) 
Community Size - 5.20* 
(p<.001) 
Contribution  -.48* 
(p<.001) 
-.449* 
(p<.001) 
Intercept 187.95* 
(p<.001) 
153.4* 
(p<.001) 
Observations 640  640 
Total Payoffs (OLS)  
 Coefficient 
Moves -88.28* 
(p=.003) 
Contribution 1.53 
(p=.83) 
High Dummy 6512.3* 
(p<.001) 
Intercept 479.02* 
(p<.001) 
R2 0.98 
Observations 32 
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Figure 6: The importance of community size in movement decisions of the High Types. 
This unwillingness of High Types to exit larger communities causes them to be 
susceptible to a coordination failure where, though they consolidate into a location with other 
High Types, they fail to attain the optimal tax and provision levels for their type. Figure 5 shows 
the average contribution over time under Fixed Tax (top right panel) and under Fixed Quantity 
(bottom left panel).	  	   
C. Voting	  
While subjects under the Voting institution take longer to sort themselves into two 
homogeneous communities than under Fixed Tax or Fixed Quantity, once they coordinate they 
are less likely to move. Furthermore, 92.5% of subjects vote for their optimal tax policy by the 
end of the session, and so the optimal policies for each type are eventually implemented within 
the sorted communities.  
Thus mobility is most successful when communities have an internal process by which 
residents may adjust their local policies without being required to relocate. The ability to vote 
with one’s feet allows types to separate and coordinate by moving to the community they like 
best. Subjects implementing their own local polices require only a few more periods to 
coordinate into separate, homogeneous communities than those choosing among locations with 
fixed policies. The ability to vote with one’s ballot then allows the residents to adapt the 
community to their preferences, reducing the possibility that a community of like-minded 
residents fails to realize the policy best suited for them. 
V.	  Conclusion	  
This paper uses laboratory experiments to study the dynamics of movement and local 
public good provision in a simple Tiebout environment and to test the effectiveness of four 
different institutions in facilitating efficient public good provision. The results suggest that 
institutions determining the level of local public good provision within a community can greatly 
affect residents’ ability to coordinate with those who share their preferences and to converge to 
an optimal outcome. 
Voluntary contributions communities enable residents with different preferences to make 
different contributions, without the need to relocate or divide their resources over multiple 
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communities, but are susceptible to the same free-riding and demand revelation problems that 
can plague public good provision at the federal level. This paper finds that voluntary 
contributions communities are characterized by free-riding, instability, and inefficient movement 
and replicates the dynamics previously found in local pure linear public goods games with two 
types of agents. This suggests these patterns and instability are robust to differences in the payoff 
function, with one distinction: when public goods are provided in equilibrium, this frequent 
movement may lead to efficiency significantly below equilibrium predictions, and mobility may 
actually be harmful to efficiency.   
Taxes requiring all members of a community to make the same contribution to the local 
public good are highly successful at sorting subjects by preferences into consolidated, 
homogenous communities. However, subjects often coordinate into, and remain in, communities 
offering suboptimal tax-provision bundles for their type. Inertia caused by the desire to be 
around others (for instance, as the result of community ties), suggests that mobility in itself is not 
sufficient for achieving an optimal allocation of public goods and that the existence of optimally-
designed policies is not sufficient for guaranteeing that communities offering these policies will 
be entered. (Potentially more concerning is the implication that new communities may then be 
entered only by the most extreme members of the society, whose preferences have not been 
satisfied elsewhere, and, if local policies cannot be adjusted when others follow, the society may 
wind up overly concentrated in communities with extreme policies.)  
When subjects have an internal process for adapting the policies of the communities they 
have entered, the local communities converge to the optimal policies for their residents. While 
subjects require slightly longer to sort into homogeneous communities when fixed local policies 
are not provided, they are eventually just as successful at reaching an optimal partition and, when 
they can then vote on the local policy, residents converge toward consuming their optimal level 
of public goods.  
Tiebout ended his discussion by asking whether local governments should have fixed 
expenditure policies (Tiebout, 1956, p.423). The results of these experiments suggest that, when 
agents have very different preferences, they will sort by preference type even when communities 
do not provide exogenous tax policies, and that local politics may be necessary for overcoming 
coordination problems, adjusting provision to the preferences of the residents, and reaching an 
efficient allocation. 
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